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CREDITOR REMEDIES AND DUE PROCESS:
COMPARING MITCHELL AND FUENTES
In February of 1972, W.T. Grant Co. brought suit against Lawrence
Mitchell for $574.17 overdue on purchases of household goods,' claim-
ing a vendor's lien on the goods.2 Plaintiff sought a writ of seques-
tration to protect its interest in goods pending the outcome of the
suit, and attached to the petition an affidavit by W.T. Grant's credit
manager which verified the petition, asserting that there was reason
to believe Mitchell would encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose
of the property.4 The city court judge issued the writ of sequestra-
1. A refrigerator, stove, washing machine, and stereo were all purchased under
installment contracts.
2. The lien was asserted pursuant to Article 3227 of the Louisiana Civil Code:
"He who has sold to another any movable property, which is not paid for, has a
preference on the price of his property, over the other creditors of the purchaser,
whether the sale was made on a credit or without, if the property still remains in
the possession of the purchaser. . .".. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3227 (West 1952).
Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306(2) (1972 version) (creditor's security
interest not dependent on continual possession by the debtor).
3. Sequestration is a provisional remedy which allows the creditor to have
property seized by court mandate prior to adjudication of the suit and is designed
to preserve property pending the outcome of the action. See generally Johnson,
Attachment and Sequestration: Provisional Remedies Under the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure, 38 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1963); Millar, Judicial Sequestration in
Louisiana: Some Account of its Sources, 30 TUL. L. REv. 201 (1956).
Article 3571 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides the grounds for
issuance of a writ of sequestration: "When one claims the ownership or right to
possession of property, or a mortgage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the
property seized under a writ of sequestration, if it is within the power of the
defendant to conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom,
or remove the property from the parish, during the pending of the action." LA.
CODE Cxv. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961) (emphasis added). Formerly, the
plaintiff was required to have "good reason to fear" that the defendant would do
some act which would deprive the plaintiff of the property. Id. Comment (a).
See generally No. 12, [1920] La. Acts 12 (repealed 1960; now LA. CoDn CIV.
PRO. AN,,. art. 3571 (West 1961)). The fear of the plaintiff is no longer at
issue; all that is required is that the defendant be "within the power" to do some
act that would alienate the plaintiff's property. See LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art.
3571, Comment (a) (West 1961).
4. Article 3501 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure required the petition
to be verified: "A writ of attachment or of sequestration shall issue only when the
nature of the claim and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon
for the issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition
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tion5 without either prior notice to Mitchell or an opportunity for
a hearing. Mitchell's motion to dissolve the writ0 on the ground that
the sequestration of his goods deprived him of procedural due process
was denied by the trial court7 and the Louisiana Supreme Court af-
firmed.8 In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. the United States Supreme
Court held that the Louisiana sequestration procedure, which allowed
judicial sequestration of property upon alleged default without afford-
ing the debtor prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing, does not
deny procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment.,
The Court in Mitchell refused to extend to sequestration the due
process safeguards in garnishment and replevin. In Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.1 the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's prejudgment
verified by, or by the separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his counsel or agent."
LA. CoDE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).
W.T. Grant also furnished a bond of $1125 for damages the defendant might
sustain if the writ was wrongfully issued. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600, 602 (1974); see LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).
5. The Louisiana statute provides that the court clerk may issue the writ. LA.
CODE Crv. PRO. ANN. arts. 282, 283 (West 1960).
6. The city court judge instructed Mitchell to file a pleading or to mal:e an
appearance in the city court within five days. Mitchell moved to dissolve the writ.
416 U.S. at 602. He also could have obtained release of the property seized by
furnishing a release bond, LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3507 (West 1961), in the
amount of one-fourth the value of the property as determined by the court, or
by one-fourth the amount of the claim, whichever is less. Id. art. 3508.
7. Mitchell also moved to dissolve the writ on the ground that the goods were
exempt from seizure under Louisiana law. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881(4)
(West 1968). The trial court denied the motion and the Louisiana supreme court
affirmed, holding that the statutory exemption of certain goods from seizure could
not prevent provisional seizure of such goods by writ of sequestration to preserve a
vendor's lien. W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 632-42, 269 So. 2d 186,
187-89 (1972).
8. 263 La. 627, 269 So. 2d 186. Mitchell based his contention principally on
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes the Supreme Court indicated
that notice and an opportunity for a hearing may not be necessary in "cases in
which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will
destroy or conceal disputed goods." Id. at 93. The Louisiana supreme court
found this exception applicable in the circumstances presented in Mitchell. 263
La. at 640, 269 So. 2d at 190.
9. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
10. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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CREDITOR REMEDIES AND DUE PROCESS
garnishment procedure" violated due process because it failed to
provide for notice or an opportunity for a hearing before depriva-
tion of wages.12 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, emphasized
that "wages" are "a specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system."" 3 The emphasis on the particular
nature of the property involved in Sniadach fostered uncertainty as
to whether prejudgment seizures of other kinds of property would
be constitutional.-* The Court, however, suggested that summary
11. Under Wisconsin law, a writ of garnishment was issued by the court clerk
upon filing of the complaint and application by the creditor. Law of Dec. 21, 1965,
ch. 507, § 1, [1965] Wis. Laws 795, as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.01 to
.24 (Supp. 1974).
12. The Court did not directly address itself to what type of hearing would be
necessary before a deprivation. Justice Harlan, concurring, suggested that "due
process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which are aimed at
establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim
against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its unre-
stricted use." 395 U.S. at 343. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the
Supreme Court adopted the aims of the hearing described in Harlan's concurrence.
Id. at 97 (quoting Justice Harlan's statement, 395 U.S. at 343). The Court did
not explain the meaning of "probable validity" or the procedure to be observed at
such a hearing. "The nature and form of such prior hearings.. . are a subject, at
this point, for legislation-not adjudication." Id. at 96-97. In Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court held that a hearing is required before termination
of welfare benefits and that the procedure must include the right to be represented
by counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and a statement of
reasons by an impartial decisionmaker. The Court's approach in Goldberg, how-
ever, may be due to the particular nature of the property involved.
State statutes have traditionally allowed prejudgment seizure of a defaulting
debtor's property by means of a writ of attachment, replevin, garnishment or
sequestration by filing an affidavit and posting a required bond. Prior notice or
hearing to the debtor was not required. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 537(1)
(Deering 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 119, §§ 1-27 (Smith-Hurd 1954), as
amended, §4 1, 4-7, 10-14, 17-21a, 22a, 25, 28 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. §§
6201(3)-(7) (McKinney 1963); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-520(1), (2), (6) (1957).
These creditor's remedies have been considered extremely harsh to the low-income
consumer. D. CAPLOVTZ, THE POOR PAY MORE, 161-67 (1967). The Supreme
Court considered this factor in Sniadach when it invalidated Wisconsin's prejudg-
ment garnishment procedure, "The result is that prejudgment garnishment of the
Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall."
395 U.S. at 341-42.
13, 395 U.S. at 340.
14. Some courts have restricted the holding in Sniadach to wage garnishment.
See, e.g., Black Watch Farms v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Ameri-
can Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970). A
majority of jurisdictions, however, have applied the .Sniadach due process require-
ment to invalidate other forms of summary procedures. See, e.g., Swarb v.
1975]
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seizure would meet the requirements of due process in certain "extra-
ordinary situations."'55
In Fuentes v. Shevinia the Supreme Court extended the Sniadach
rationale17 and held unconstitutional the Florida and Pennsylvania
prejudgment replevin statutes, which allowed repossession of house-
hold goods without prior notice or opportunity for a hearing.1"
Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (cognovit
note replevin); Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1971) (attachment).
15. 395 U.S. at 339. The Court stated that no special situation was present:
"Petitioner was a resident of this Wisconsin community and in personam jurisdic-
tion was readily obtainable." Id.
16. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
17. The Court rejected the contention that a hearing is required only with re-
spect to the deprivation of wages or other necessities of life. 407 U.S. at 89.
18. The laws of both states allowed a private party to obtain a writ of replevin
upon ex parte application to the clerk of the court and upon posting of bond in an
amount double the value of the property to be taken; defendant could regain pos-
session by posting a counter bond. Act of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 28 (1967]
Fla. Laws 660 (now FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01-21 (Supp. 1975)); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1821, 1824, 1826 (1967). The Florida statute required the party
seeking replevin to file a complaint and prosecute an action for possession, alleging
in a conclusory fashion that he was "lawfully entitled" to possession. Law of June
27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 28 [1967] Fla. Laws 660. The Pennsylvania statute merely
required the filing of an affidavit stating the value of the property, without requir-
ing the initiation of a lawsuit. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1821, 1824, 1826 (1967).
The Fuentes Court declared that the bond requirement was not a sufficient
constitutional replacement of the right to a prior hearing. "The minimal deterrent
effect of a bond requirement is, in a practical sense, no substitute for an informed
evaluation by a neutral official." 407 U.S. at 83. The Court also rejected the
safeguard of a release bond as insufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Id. at 85. For a discussion of the Florida replevin statute invalidated in Fuentes
see Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Tradi-
tional Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 60 (1972).
In Fuentes the purchases were made under conditional sales contracts that con-
tained a provision allowing the seller to "take back" or "retake" the goods upon
default. The Court concluded that these provisions did not waive appellant's
constitutional right to a pretrial hearing. 407 U.S. at 95-96. "(A] waiver of con-
stitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear. .. .The con-
ditional sales contracts here simply provided that upon a default the seller 'may
take back,' 'may retake' or 'may repossess' merchandise." Id. at 95. The Court,
however, did discuss the requirements of an effective waiver established in D.H.
Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (a contractual waiver of due
process rights must be voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly made). See also
Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (applying Ooermeyer in a consumer con-
text); Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, 489 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1973) (invalidating
waiver of rights in lease).
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Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, confirmed the Court's posi-
tion that summary procedure may be allowed in "extraordinary
situations"1" and enumerated factors that would justify seizure with-
out an opportunity for a hearing: (1) a need to secure an important
governmental or public interest; (2) a special need for prompt action;
or (3) state maintenance of strict control over use of its power.2 0
Moreover, the Court declared that due process attaches even when
the debtor lacks full title to the chattels and his claim to the property
is in dispute and that opportunity for a hearing is required before
one can be deprived of "any significant property interest."21
19. 407 U.S. at 90. "These situations, however, must be truly unusual. Only in
a few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure without opportunity
for a prior hearing." Id. at 90-91.
20. Id. at 91. Under this analysis the Court has reconciled almost all prior
cases allowing summary seizure of property without a hearing. See Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of misbranded food
and drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (protection of public in-
terest against bank failure); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931)
(seizure of property to collect federal taxes); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94
(1921) (attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court). But see
McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929), aff'g per curiain 127 Me. 110, 141 A.
699 (1928). In McKay the Supreme Court upheld a general attachment statute,
relying on Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1926). Fuentes limited the appli-
cation of McKay to "extraordinary situations" by strictly analogizing it to Coffin
Bros. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
21. 407 U.S. at 86. This hearing requirement for a "significant property in-
terest" has caused other types of summary seizure procedures to be struck down as
unconstitutional. See Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp. 630 (N.D.
Ga. 1974) (Georgia statutory garnishment scheme unconstitutional); Roscoe v.
Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1973) (Maryland attachment proceeding in-
valid); Bay State Harness Horseracing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Industries,
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973) (Massachusetts statute governing pre-
judgment real estate attachments invalid on its face); Gunter v. Merchants Warren
Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973) (Maine prejudgment statute
governing real estate attachment unconstitutional); Sena v. Montoya, 346 F.
Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1972) (New Mexico replevin statute unconstitutional); Walker
v. Johnson County, 209 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1973) (summary nuisance abatement
unconstitutional) ; Automotive Merchandise, Inc. v. Smith, 297 Minn. 475, 212
N.W.2d 678 (1973) (Minnesota replevin statute declared unconstitutional)
(dicta); Bevan v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 74 Misc. 2d 443,
345 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (New York statute permitting forced retirement
of tenured teacher without prior hearing unconstitutional); Trifaro v. Zoning Bd.
of Appeals, 73 Misc. 2d 483, 342 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (New York
Municipal Home Rule Law unconstitutional); Richman v. Richman, 72 Misc. 2d
803, 339 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (New York attachment statute unconsti-
tutional); City of Everett v. Slade, 83 Wash. 2d 80, 515 P.2d 1295 (1973) (pro-
vision of Uniform Controlled Substances Act allowing seizure of property violates
1975]
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Justice White, dissenting, argued that the due process clause did
not contemplate inflexible procedures applicable to all situations.22
He further declared that the procedural requirements provided in
the replevin statutes were sufficient because of the seller's property
interest in the goods, pending payment in full, and the procedural
consideration favoring protection of the seller's interest by preventing
further use and deterioration of his security, with protection afforded
to the buyer against loss by the seller's posting a security bond.23
In Mitchell the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Louisiana's sequestration procedure without explicitly overruling
Fuentes.24 Justice White, writing for the majority,25 balanced the
debtor's interest in the sequestered goods, measured by his title sub-
ject to the vendor's lien and his investment in the depreciated goods, 20
with the creditor's interest-the balance due on the goods and his
due process); Olympic Forests Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wash. 2d 418,
511 P.2d 1002 (1973) (prejudgment garnishment unconstitutional); Rogoski v.
Hammond, 9 Wash. App. 500, 513 P.2d 285 (1973) (prejudgment attachment
statute unconstitutional).
22. 407 U.S. at 101-02 (White, J., dissenting).
[ . T]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible pro-
cedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.... [W]hat pro-
cedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must
begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by govern-
mental action.
Id., quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
23. 407 U.S. at 99-100 (White, J., dissenting).
24. 416 U.S. at 615-16.
25. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun and White, all dissenters in Fuentes,
were joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, who did not participate in the
Fuentes decision, to form the majority in Mitchell. Justice Stewart, dissenting in
Mitchell, declared: "The only perceivable change that has occurred since the
Fuentes case is in the makeup of this Court. A basic change in the law upon a
ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconcep-
tion that this institution is little different from the two political branches of the
Government." Id. at 635-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
26. The debtor's interest in the property, "until the purchase price was paid in
full, was no greater than the surplus remaining, if any, after foreclosure and sale
of the property in the event of his default and satisfaction of outstanding claims."
Id. at 604. See LA. CoDE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 2373 (West 1961) (debtor receives
surplus remaining after payment of costs, payment of amount due to seizing credi-
tor, and payment of inferior encumbrances).
[Vol. 10:243
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need to protect the security value of the property.27 He concluded,
"with this duality in mind," that the Louisiana sequestration pro-
cedure constitutionally protects both interests. 2S
Mitchell argued that an opportunity for a hearing must precede
any actual deprivation of private property.29 The Court viewed the
pre-Sniadach cases as requiring a hearing only before final depriva-
tion of property and concluded that a predetermination hearing was
not necessary.30 Moreover, the Court distinguished Sniadach as deal-
ing with a specialized type of property and applying to cases where
the creditor had no prior interest in the property.31
The Court also distinguished the replevin laws considered in
Fuentes from the Louisiana sequestration statute,32 emphasizing that
it would be unconstitutional to issue a writ of replevin merely on
a conclusory claim of ownership and wrongful detention of the
goods. 3 Sequestration, however, is available only upon an allegation
of the specific facts of the claim and the grounds for the seizure,
27. 416 U.S. at 608. "[T]he buyer in possession of consumer goods will unde-
niably put the property to its intended use, and the resale value of the merchandise
will steadily decline as it is used over a period of time. . . . [TJhe seller's interest
in the property as security is steadily and irretrievably eroded." Id.
Justice White, in defining the creditor's interest in monetary terms, followed his
dissent in Fuentes, but rejected his prior view of the debtor's interest as the con-
tinued use and possession of the goods. "The interests of the buyer and seller are
obviously antagonistic . . . : the buyer wants the use of the property pending
final judgment; the seller's interest is to prevent further use and deterioration of
his security." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 100 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
28. 416 U.S. at 604.
29. Petitioner relied on numerous Supreme Court decisions, including Sniadach
and Fuentes. See id. at 611 n.10 (citing cases).
30. For this principle Justice White relied on cases considered in Fuentes to be
"extraordinary situations." Id. at 611-12. Justice White's refusal to categorize
these decisions appears consistent with his view in Fuentes that procedural due
process requires flexible tests. See note 22 supra.
31. "Sniadach involved the prejudgment garnishment of wages--'a specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.' . . . The
suing creditor in Sniadach had no prior interest in the property attached, and the
opinion did not purport to govern the typical case of the installment seller .... "
416 U.S. 600, 614-15. But see North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
32. See notes 3, 4, 18 supra.
33. 416 U.S. at 616-18.
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accompanied by a verified affidavit.a4 Thus the Court concluded that
issuance of a writ of sequestration requires a showing by the creditor
of the existence of a debt, a lien and a default in payment.85 Replevin
however, is available through application of a broad fault standard
that is inherently subject to an adversary hearing3 0 Justice White
also noted that the sequestration procedure minimized the risk of a
34. It appears that the plaintiff need only allege that a debt is owed and that
the debtor has the property. "The facts that the items are movable, that they be-
long to the lessee and are located on the leased premises, give rise to the conclusion
that 'it is within the power of the defendant' to conceal, dispose of, etc. the
property. To allege simply that 'it is within the power of the defendant' would be
only a conclusion of fact." Montagne v. Tinker, 197 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. Ct.
App. 1967).
35. 416 U.S. at 606-07, 618. Justice White stressed that these issues were well
suited to documentary proof. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that a fair
adversary hearing must be given on all of the issues before the deprivation. Id. at
607. Citing Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915) (possessory
action for real property), the Court stated that the issues can be limited in actions
for possession. 416 U.S. at 607. The Court also relied on Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972), and Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170 (1923). In Lindsey a
hearing was permitted under Oregon's Forceable Entry and Wrongful Detainer
Statute to consider the issues of default on rent, breach of covenant, or holdover
beyond the expiration of the lease, but the tenant was prevented from asserting his
defenses. The Court found that this procedure accommodated due process, since
the substantive property law of Oregon provided that the obligations of landlord
and tenant were independent, thus requiring the tenant to file a separate action.
When contractual obligations are mutually dependent, however, a full adversary
hearing on all the issues, including the raising of defenses, may be required. 86
HARv. L. REv. 85, 91 n.34 (1972).
For a discussion of Sniadach and Fuentes and why Lindsey should not be used
to limit the scope of the hearing required by these two decisions see Clark &
Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59
VA. L. Rv. 355, 406-09 (1973).
36. "In Florida and Pennsylvania property was only to be replevied in accord
with state policy if it had been 'wrongfully detained.' This broad 'fault' standard
is inherently subject to factual determination and adversarial input." 416 U.S. at
617. Justice Stewart, however, considered the issues relevant to the issuance of a
writ of replevin-the existence of a security interest and a default-the same as
those relevant to the issuance of a writ of sequestration. Id. at 633 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
The issues in sequestration are subject to a fault standard that is deemed nar-
rower than the fault standard in replevin. The requirement in sequestration that
it be "within the power" of the debtor to conceal or damage the goods does not
appear to be any narrower than the replevin requirement that the goods be "wrong-
fully detained." It seems that the specific facts alleged in sequestration to show
that the debtor has the power to conceal or damage the goods would be the facts
necessary to show his possession of the goods. It is elementary that when goods are
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wrongful taking by providing for judicial control 37 and by entitling
the debtor to damages and attorney's fees if the writ is dissolved.18
Replevin and sequestration differ more in form than in the actual
effects of the procedures on the parties. 9 It seems that the only
37. "Mitchell was not at the unsupervised mercy of the creditor and court
functionaries. The Louisiana law provides for judicial control of the process from
beginning to end." Id. at 616. The Court noted that Louisiana sequestration
"provides for an immediate hearing and dissolution of the writ"; the Pennsylvania
replevin statute did not require that there ever be an opportunity for a hearing on
the merits of the claim and the Florida statute merely provided for an eventual
hearing. Id. at 618.
38. Id. at 617. See LA. CODE CrV. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961).
39. "The Louisiana sequestration procedure now before us is remarkably similar
to the statutory provisions at issue in Fuentes . . . ." 416 U.S. at 629 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). That the sequestration affidavit in Mitchell called for more informa-
tion than the replevin affidavit in Fuentes, and that a writ of sequestration is
authorized by a judge rather than a clerk were considered by Justice Stewart to
be of no constitutional significance. Id. at 631-33. Outside of the Orleans parish
(where W.T. Grant's writ was issued), the issuance of a writ is performed by the
court clerk. The provision which gives the function of authorization of the writ to
a judge does not suggest that the nature of the duty was to change from a minis-
terial act. The comment to this section specifically states that no change in the
law is intended. LA. CODE CrV. PRO. ANN. art. 281, Comment (West 1961).
In Mitchell the majority contended that the function of the judge is more than
a ministerial act, that it is an act of evaluating the grounds for issuance from the
specific facts. 416 U.S. at 616-17 n.12. To substantiate this point, the majority
relied on Hancock Bank v. Alexander, 256 La. 643, 237 So. 2d 669 (1970), and
Wright v. Hughes, 254 So. 2d 293, 296-97 (La. App. 1971). In Hancock the
Supreme Court of Louisiana held that when a bank petition for sequestration
simply alleged an indebtedness on a promissory note, a writ would not be issued.
"[S]uch writ shall issue only when nature of claim and amount thereof and
grounds relied on clearly appear from specific facts shown by petition or affidavit
and sequestration should not have been maintained . . . ." 256 La. 643, 237 So.
2d 669. In Wright a writ of sequestration was issued by a judge on the movable
property of a lessee upon the allegation that the lessor had good reason to believe
the lessee would conceal or dispose of the movables subject to a lessor's privilege.
The only evidence in support of this argument was a general statement of the
rental manager that prior tenants had concealed or disposed of property. The
Louisiana intermediate court held that "[slince a writ of sequestration issues with-
out a hearing, specific facts as to the grounds relied upon for issuance must be
contained in the verified petition in order that the issuing judge can properly
evaluate the grounds." 254 So. 2d 293, 296-97. Justice Stewart interpreted these
two cases as standing "only for the proposition that a writ should not issue unless
sworn allegations are formally sufficient, which may mean nothing more than that
the proper standardized form be completely filed in." 416 U.S. at 633 n.4
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
Apparently the judge or clerk ascertains the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's
allegations and if the necessary sufficiency is found, the writ is issued. The issuance
of the writ of sequestration is based solely on the plaintiff's allegations. The Mit-
1975]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
relevant factors distinguishing sequestration from replevin are judicial
authorization, allegation of specific facts, a prompt lawsuit to obtain
dissolution of the writ, and a provision for damages and attorney's
fees.40 Justice White, speaking for the majority, felt that the issues
relevant to the issuance of a writ of sequestration are susceptible to
documentation 4i and therefore an adversary hearing prior to depriva-
tion of property is not necessary.42 This, however, fails to take into
account the fact that many "defenses are not documentary, such as
deceptive selling practices, warranty violations and collection harass-
ments."4 3  Also, under Louisiana law the merits of the creditor's
claim, the defenses of the debtor not relevant to the issues of default,
and the existence of a lien may not be inquired into at the hearing
on the motion to dissolve.4 As a result, a debtor with a valid defense
chell majority, considering these cases as establishing the "probability" that the
creditor will succeed, id. at 609, ignores the situation of a "party mistakenly but
firmly convinced that his view of the facts and law will prevail, and therefore
quite willing to risk the cost of litigation." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83
(1972).
Justice White stressed that a risk of wrongful taking is minimized because a
creditor would be subject to damages and attorney's fees. 416 U.S. at 617. This is
certainly consistent with his dissent in Fuentes: "Dollar-and-cents considerations
weigh heavily against false claims of default as well as against precipitate action
that would allow no opportunity for mistakes to surface and be corrected. Nor
does it seem to me that creditors would lightly undertake the expense of instituting
replevin action and putting up bonds." 407 U.S. at 100-01. The Court in Mitchell
looked at the "probability that case will succeed" before deprivation of property,
whereas the Fuentes Court was concerned with the probable validity of the claim.
In Fuentes Justice Stewart suggested that the debtor should be able to show valid
defenses that could be examined in determining the probable validity of the credi-
tor's claim. Id. at 87. In determining "probability of success" the creditor must
show specific facts as to the issues of debt, lien and delinquency, but defenses of
the debtor are not brought before the issuing judge.
40. See Hobbs, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of
Consumer Due Process, 8 CLEARI NCHOUS. Rxv. 182 (1974).
41. See note 35 supra.
42. 416 U.S. at 617-18.
43. Hobbs, supra note 40, at 184.
44. Article 3506 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides for dissolu-
tion of the writ, whereby "only the grounds for the auxiliary remedy can be in-
quired into on the motion to dissolve, and not the merits of the main demand."
LA. CoDn Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3506, Comment (c) (West 1961).
In Sniadach the Court suggested that at the hearing before deprivation, the
debtor must be allowed "to tender any defense he may have, whether it be fraud
or otherwise." 395 U.S. at 339 (1969). The Court in Fuentes considered as the
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is forced to wait until a full trial. Moreover, if the debtor has a
defense that can be asserted at the motion to dissolve, he still may
be deprived of his property for a substantial time.45 Clearly such
debtors require an opportunity for a prompt hearing.
The Mitchell rationale, balancing the interests of the parties to
determine whether those interests are adequately protected, introduces
a flexible rule into procedural due process 46 that ignores the con-
sumer's need for the use and possession of the particular goods.47
Such a rule will appreciably frustrate the low-income consumer's
desire to maintain a decent standard of living.4s
purpose of the hearing the determination of at least the probable validity of the
claim and suggested that defenses should be raised at the hearing prior to depriva-
tion. See note 39 supra. The Court in Mitchell, by upholding the Louisiana pro-
cedure and delaying considerations of these issues until after deprivation, retreated
greatly from the Sniadach and Fuentes view.
As a matter of substantive commercial law, . . . the buyer of goods is per-
mitted to raise personal defenses such as breach of warranty, fraud, or failure
of consideration in an action by the seller to recover the unpaid portion of the
purchase price. In fact, resisting further payments is normally the only
leverage a consumer debtor has. If the due process heating is to mean any-
thing, it must provide an opportunity to determine what caused the transac-
tion to break down.
Clark & Landers, supra note 35, at 407.
45. In Mitchell the goods were sequestered on February 7, 1972, and the
hearing on the motion to dissolve was held 36 days later on March 14. 416 U.S.
at 602-03. A 36 day delay is significant if the debtor has a need for goods and is
unable to afford a release bond. If the debtor cannot get a release of property
through a bond, then the actual time of deprivation of the goods would be a
function of the caseload of the court and the debtor's ability to retain counsel.
46. The requirement of due process, therefore, may vary with the manner in
which the interests of the parties are defined and with the perceived adequacy of
available procedural safeguards other than prior notice and hearing. See note 22
supra.
47. "The system protects debtor's interest in every conceivable way, except al-
lowing him to have the property to start with . . . ." 416 U.S. at 618. In
Fuentes the Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment as protecting "any sig-
nificant property interest" and found that the continued use and possession of the
goods by the debtor was a significant interest that must be protected. 407 U.S. at
86. By balancing the interests of the parties in solely monetary terms, the Court in
Mitchell precludes consideration of the consumer's interest in the use and posses-
sion of the goods. Thus a property interest of this type may no longer be protected
by the fourteenth amendment.
48. "Of course, the poor risks are always free to do without the goods that are
available to them .... Americans in all walks of life are trained to consume in
order to win the respect of others and to maintain their self-respect. These social
pressures to consume are perhaps inevitable in a society characterized by a rising
standard of living." D. CAPLOVITZ, THn PooR PAY MoRE 180 (1967). The
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Mitchell seems to overrule the holding in Fuentes that notice and
a hearing are necessary before a temporary deprivation of an im-
portant property interest.49 The Court, however, suggested that the
replevin statutes in Fuentes would still be unconstitutional. Thus
a debtor's due process rights with respect to other types of provisional
or default remedies are uncertain.51 The courts will now be faced
with the difficult task of determining whether a particular procedure
falls under the Mitchell or the Fuentes analysis.r2 Mitchell neverthe-
less provides a guidepost to state legislatures devising constitutional
prejudgment remedies. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
effect of depriving one of property such as a stove or refrigerator will be very
harsh to a consumer who has not the money to obtain a release bond or to retain
counsel to defend against the creditor.
49. In sweeping language, Fuentes . . enunciated the principle that the
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process requires an adversary
hearing before an individual may be temporarily deprived of any possessory
interest in tangible personal property, however brief the dispossession and
however slight his monetary interest in the property. The Court's decision
today withdraws significantly from the full reach of that principle, and to
this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled.
416 U.S. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 615-16.
51. "Our decision will not affect recent cases dealing with garnishment or sum-
mary self-help remedies of secured creditors or landlords." Id. at 620 n.14.
52. One week after Mitchell the Supreme Court used the Fuentes "extraordinary
situations" test to uphold a Puerto Rico statute that provided for the forfeiture of
vessels used for unlawful purposes. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663 (1974). The Court held that an "extraordinary situation" existed
because seizure fostered the public interest by allowing the government to assert
in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 679-80. The Court distinguished Fuentes on the grounds
that in Fuentes seizure was initiated by self-interested private parties, not by
government officials. Id. at 678. Justices White and Powell, concurring, cited
Mitchell as one of those situations in which no prior hearing is required. Id. at
691. Apparently the Supreme Court will continue to apply the "extraordinary
situation" test and limit Mitchell to cases involving self-interested private parties.
In Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 435-37 (S.D. Fla. 1974), the court
upheld the Florida mechanics lien law, relying on Mitchell and distinguishing
Fuentes and Sniadach. In Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (S.D. Tex.
1974), the court, relying on Mitchell, held unconstitutional the Texas sequestration
procedure which did not provide for judicial supervision of issuance of the writ
or provide the debtor an immediate hearing. See also Bert Randolph Sugar &
Wrestling Revue, Inc. v. Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), prob. juris. noted, 421 U.S. 908 (1975) (New York law permitting pre-
judgment attachment held unconstitutional); Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F.
Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1974) (North Dakota attachment statute held constitutional).
[Vol. 10:243
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol10/iss1/7
1975] CREDITOR REMEDIES AND DUE PROCESS 255
Inc.53 the Supreme Court applied both Mitchell and Fuentes in strik-
ing down Georgia's garnishment statute as applied to commercial
accounts. 54 Justice White, writing for the majority,55 reiterated the
Mitchell factors: the need for a judge, allegation of specific facts, the
requirement of an immediate hearing to dissolve a writ, and a prompt
hearing on the merits. 51 Thus it appears that a constitutional ex parte
procedure can be devised that includes the factors that validated
Louisiana's sequestration statute.
Mark L. Juster
53. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
54. The Court also asserted that Sniadach is not limited to wages or necessities.
Id. at 605-06. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
55. Justice White joined the Mitchell dissenters. Justice Powell concurring,
would invalidate the statute on Mitchell alone. 419 U.S. at 609-14.
56. Id. at 606-07.
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